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Winstead v. Derreberry: Stepchildren and the Presumption
of Dependence Under the North Carolina
Workers' Compensation Act
One of the general assembly's primary goals in enacting the North Carolina
Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) in 19291 was to "grant certain and
speedy relief to employees, or, in the case of death, to their dependents."' 2 One
way the general assembly sought to further this goal was to create a conclusive
presumption of dependence for those most likely to have been factually depen-
dent on the deceased worker. 3 This presumption alleviates the expense and de-
lay that would result if these claimants were forced to prove actual dependency.
In Winstead v. Derreberry,4 a case of first impression, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals interpreted the statutory presumption of dependency as it ap-
plies to stepchildren. The court held that to qualify for the presumption, a
stepchild must have been substantially dependent on the decedent.5 This Note
analyzes Winstead and concludes that although the court's interpretation of the
Act is sound, its articulation of the substantial dependency test is somewhat
vague and provides little guidance on how the test is to be applied. This uncer-
tainty creates an opportunity for future courts to expand the test beyond a sim-
ple inquiry into the sources from which the stepchild has received support. Any
expansion of the scope of the substantial dependency test would threaten to de-
stroy the efficiency that is the goal of the statute.
In Winstead plaintiff's natural father, Kenneth Winstead, died in an acci-
dent compensable under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.6 At
the time of his death, Mr. Winstead lived with his second wife, Elizabeth Win-
stead, a daughter from his previous marriage, Melanie Winstead, and Elizabeth
Winstead's two children from her previous marriage, Chad and Ronald Brewer
(Chad and Ronald). Both parents were employed and both contributed to the
support of the family.7 In addition to Mr. and Mrs. Winstead's earnings, the
family received approximately 100 dollars per month from Chad and Ronald's
natural father, as well as some support from Mr. Winstead's first wife.8
At a hearing before a deputy director of the North Carolina Industrial
Commission (the Commission), Mr. Winstead's employer conceded liability for
Mr. Winstead's death. Thus, the only point in controversy was the distribution
of the death benefits. 9 Under the Act, the class made up of those survivors
1. Act of March 11, 1929, ch. 120, 1929 N. C. Sess. Laws 117 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97 (1985)).
2. Bass v. Mooresville Mills, 11 N.C. App. 631, 633, 182 S.E.2d 246, 248 (1971), cert. denied,
281 N.C. 755, 191 S.E.2d 353 (1972).
3. Winstead v. Derreberry, 73 N.C. App. 35, 39-40, 326 S.E.2d 66, 70 (1985).
4. 73 N.C. App. 35, 326 S.E.2d 66 (1985).
5. Id. at 42, 326 S.E.2d at 71.
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97 (1985).




determined to be "wholly dependent" on the decedent share the death benefits
equally, to the exclusion of all others.' 0 Certain classes of claimants, including
the decedent's children, are conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent.'1
The Deputy Commissioner concluded as a matter of law that as stepchildren,
Chad and Ronald met the statutory definition of "child"'12 and, therefore, were
conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent on Mr. Winstead and entitled to
share equally in the death benefits with Melanie. 13 Melanie appealed the award
to the full Commission, which affirmed the Deputy Commissioner's decision.14
On appeal Melanie argued that the definition of "child" in section 97-2(12),
"stepchildren or acknowledged illegitimate child dependent on the deceased,"' 5
requires that a stepchild be dependent as a condition for being presumed wholly
dependent, and that the dependency the Act requires is legal dependency and
not factual dependency. 16 She contended that because stepparents have no legal
duty to support their stepchildren under North Carolina law, 17 Chad and Ron-
ald were not legally dependent on Mr. Winstead and, therefore, were not enti-
tled to share in the death benefits.' 8
Melanie also argued that implementing the Commission's interpretation of
the Act would violate the equal protection clauses of the state19 and federal 20
constitutions.2 1 Under the Commission's interpretation, stepchildren would be
presumed wholly dependent on both their stepparents and natural parents, and
as a result, would have a potential for double recovery which would not be avail-
able to children who do not have a stepparent. 22
The court of appeals agreed with Melanie that the Act requires that a
stepchild must be dependent on the deceased to be presumed wholly depen-
dent.23 It did not agree, however, that the statute requires legal dependency.
The court held instead that a stepchild qualifies for the presumption if he or she
was "substantially dependent" on the deceased employee.24 The court based
this holding on its grammatical interpretation of the language of section 97-
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-38.
11. Id. § 97-39.
12. See id. § 97-2(12).
13. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 36, 326 S.E.2d at 68.
14. Id.
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(12). For the purposes of the Act, "child" is defined to include "a
posthumous child, a child legally adopted prior to the injury of the employee, and a stepchild or
acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased, but does not include married children
unless wholly dependent upon him." Id.
16. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 40, 326 S.E.2d at 70.
17. See In re Dunston, 18 N.C App. 647, 649, 197 S.E.2d 560, 562 (1973) (stepfather is under
no duty to support his stepchildren).
18. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 40, 326 S.E.2d at 70.
19. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 43, 326 S.E.2d at 72.
22. Id. Melanie argued that creating a possibility of double recovery by stepchildren is arbi-
trary discrimination against natural children. Claimant-Appellant's Brief at 10, Winstead.
23. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 41, 326 S.E.2d at 71.
24. Id.
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2(12)25 and on its recognition that because stepchildren have no legal right to
support from their stepparents, they could never meet a requirement of legal
dependency.26 The court established a five factor test for determining substan-
tial dependency. 27 Under the court's test, a stepchild has the burden of proving
he or she was "substantially dependent on the financial support of the deceased
stepparent as compared with all other sources of financial support available to
maintain his [or her] accustomed standard of living."'28
The court determined that in the year immediately preceding Mr. Win-
stead's death, Chad and Ronald had been eighty-four percent dependent on him,
and in the year before they had been sixty-nine percent dependent on him.29
Based on these calculations, the court held that Chad and Ronald were substan-
tially dependent on Mr. Winstead and affirmed the Commission's award. Rely-
ing on decisions from other jurisdictions, the court summarily rejected Melanie's
constitutional argument.30
Workers' compensation has been defined as "a plan or system for compen-
sating workmen injured and physically disabled as a direct result of their
employment, regardless of the question of fault or negligence." 31 The first com-
prehensive state workers' compensation act in the United States was passed in
New York in 1910.32 By 1921 all but a few states had enacted workers' compen-
sation statutes.33 This sudden onslaught of legislation was spurred by the "ugly
facts of industrial accidents" near the turn of the century.3 4 During that time
25. Id.
26. Id. at 40, 326 S.E.2d at 70.
27. The court stated:
The factors to be considered are the actual amount and consistency of the support derived
by the stepchild from (1) the deceased stepparent, (2) the natural parent married to the
stepparent, (3) the estranged natural parent, whether such support is voluntary or required
by law, (4) the income of the stepchild, and (5) any other funds regularly received for the
support of the stepchild.
Id. at 42, 326 S.E.2d at 71.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 43, 326 S.E.2d at 72. The parties stipulated that in 1981, Mr. Winstead earned
$17,832, Mrs. Winstead earned $6,652, and Chad and Ronald's natural father contributed $1,200,
and that in 1982, Mr. Winstead earned $20,478, Mrs. Winstead earned $2,781, and Chad and Ron-
ald's natural father contributed $1,200. The court calculated Mr. Winstead's share of Chad and
Ronald's support by finding the percentage of the total contributions of Mr. Winstead, Mrs. Win-
stead, and the stepchildren's natural father that Mr. Winstead's earnings represented. Id.
30. Id. at 43, 326 S.E.2d at 72 (citing Flint River Mills v. Henry, 239 Ga. 347, 236 S.E.2d 583
(1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 1003 (1978); Shahan v. Beasley Hot Shot Service, 91 N.M. 462,
575 P.2d 1347 (1978)). The court stated that these decisions were directly on point and that it was
"persuaded that these decisions are sound." Id. at 43, 326 S.E.2d at 72.
31. 1 W. SCHNEIDER, SCHNEIDER'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1, at 1 (1941).
32. J. KEECH, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 1929-1940, at 10 (1942).
Prior to 1910 two states-Maryland and Montana-had passed acts that covered only a few indus-
tries; both were held unconstitutional shortly after their passage. Id.
33. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 573 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON].
34. J. KEECH, supra note 32, at 1. "On the basis of average, every laborer will be injured at
least twice during his lifetime, every second man will be crippled, and every twenty fifth man will be
killed." H. SAMPSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 1 (1914).
For a discussion of the decrease in industrial injury rates by the 1950s, see E. CHEIT, INJURY
AND RECOVERY IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 5-6 (1961).
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workers labored under unsafe and inhumane conditions. 35 Employers had little
incentive to correct these conditions because the common-law tort system pro-
vided a series of defenses that effectively prevented the vast majority of injured
workers from receiving compensation for their injuries. 36 Even when compensa-
tion was recoverable, litigation often involved long delays, 37 and litigation ex-
penses left successful plaintiffs with very limited compensation. 38
Workers' compensation legislation was enacted in response to these condi-
tions, for the purpose of shifting the economic burden of industrial injuries from
workers to employers and, ultimately, to consumers. 39 Worker's compensation
is intended to provide swift and certain relief for injured workers and their fami-
lies and to eliminate the need for the prolonged and costly litigation that typified
the common-law tort system.40
The majority of workers' compensation acts in the United States have cer-
tain structural similarities. All the acts provide death benefits to the dependents
of workers who die in compensable accidents. 4 1 Most statutes contain a cate-
gory of relatives who are presumed dependent-usually the employee's widow
or widower and children-and who recover without any proof of actual depen-
dency, and a category of persons who must establish factual dependency to re-
cover.42 In some states, a claimant must be a member of a statutory class of
compensable relatives to receive any benefits regardless of his or her degree of
actual dependency.4 3 Other states allow recovery by anyone actually dependent
on the deceased. 44 In most states claimants who were factually or presumptively
35. See H. SAMPSON, supra note 34, at 7-8; Walton, Workmen's Compensation and the Theory
of Professional Risk, 11 COLUM. L. REv. 36, 39-40 (1911) (discussing the dangers faced by industrial
workers in the early 1900s).
36. See E. CHErt, supra note 34, at 10-11; W. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION 3-11 (1936); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, § 80, at 568-72 (discussing the "unholy
trinity" of the common-law tort defenses--contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fel-
low servant rule-and other impediments to worker recovery); Walton, supra note 35, at 38-39.
Schneider estimated that before enactment of worker's compensation legislation, 70% of all
injured workers were unable to recover any compensation. 1 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 31, § 1, at
3. See also W. DODD, supra, at 16-26 (discussing the inadequacies of the common-law system).
37. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, § 80, at 572-73; 1 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 31, § 1,
at 2. In 1914 one author calculated that the average time between injury and final judgment in
California was almost five years. H. SAMPSON, supra note 34, at 4.
38. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, § 80, at 572-73; H. SAMPSON, supra note 34, at 4.
39. See Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 92, 63 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1951); Daniels v.
Swofford, 55 N.C. App. 555, 558, 286 S.E.2d 582, 584 (1982); A. HONNOLD, A TREATISE ON THE
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS § 2, at 6-8 & n.9 (1917); N.Y.
STATE BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO STUDY THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW 7 (1957); 1 W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 31, § 3, at 3-5.
40. See Rorie v. Holly Farms Poultry Co., 306 N.C. 706, 709, 295 S.E.2d 458, 460 (1982); Bass
v. Mooresville Mills, 11 N.C. App. 631, 633, 182 S.E.2d 260, 261, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 755, 191
S.E.2d 353 (1972); A. HONNOLD, supra note 39, § 2, at 9 & n.12. For a discussion of the legislative
history of workers' compensation in North Carolina, see J. KEECH, supra note 32, at 13-42. For a
discussion of the social philosophy underlying workers' compensation, see Larson, The Nature and
Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 209-11 (1952).
41. 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 62.10, at 11-1 (1983).
42. See id. § 62.10, at 11-4; § 62.30, at 11-62 to -64.
43. See, ag., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-17 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-210 (1983).
44. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-13 (Supp 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-120 (Law. Co-op
1985).
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wholly dependent have priority over those who were only partially dependent. 45
North Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act4 6 follows this general pat-
tern. Section 97-38 of the Act divides death benefit claimants into three classes:
"wholly dependent," "partially dependent," and "next of kin." 47 These classes
are arranged in order of priority according to degree of dependency on the dece-
dent. If there are wholly dependent claimants they share all benefits equally to
the exclusion of the other classes. If there are no wholly dependent claimants,
then the benefits are divided among the partially dependent claimants according
to their degrees of dependency. If there are no wholly or partially dependent
claimants and all parties agree, the total amount of benefits payable is dis-
counted to its present value and distributed equally among the deceased's next of
kin. 48
Under this system of benefits, if there are any wholly dependent claimants,
then other claimants must show that they are wholly dependent to receive any
benefits. Furthermore, the amount each claimant will receive is directly related
to the number of claimants who qualify as wholly dependent.
There are two ways in which a claimant may qualify as wholly dependent
under the Act. A claimant may either be wholly dependent as "shall be deter-
mined in accordance with the facts as the facts may be at the time of the acci-
dent," or, if the claimant is the decedent's widow, widower, or child, he or she
may be "conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent" under section 97-39.49
45. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 41, § 64.30, at 11-196 to -199.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97 (1985).
47. Id. § 97-38.
48. Id. The Act requires death benefits to be distributed as follows:
(1) Persons wholly dependent for support upon the earnings of the deceased employee
at the time of the accident shall be entitled to receive the entire compensation payable share
and share alike to the exclusion of all other persons. If there be only one person wholly
dependent, then that person shall receive the entire compensation payable.
(2) If there is no person wholly dependent, then any person partially dependent for
support upon the earnings of the deceased employee at the time of the accident shall be
entitled to receive a weekly payment of compensation as hereinabove provided, but such
weekly payment shall be the same proportion of the weekly compensation provided for a
whole dependent as the amount annually contributed by the deceased employee to the
support of such partial dependent bears to the annual earnings of the deceased at the time
of the accident.
(3) If there is no person wholly dependent, and the person or all persons partially
dependent is or are within the classes of persons defined, 'as next of kin' in G.S. 97-40,
whether or not such persons or such classes are of kin to the deceased employee in equal
degree, and all so elect, he or they may take share and share alike, the computed value of
the amount provided for whole dependents in (1) above ....
Id.
The total amount of death benefits paid to the decedent's dependents is calculated as a fixed
percentage of the decedent's average weekly wages, which is paid to the eligible beneficiaries for 400
weeks. The statute further states that after the 400-week period "compensation payments due a
dependent child shall be continued until such child reaches the age of 18." Id.
No adjustment is made in the size of the award to compensate for the number of dependents
sharing in the funds. The dependents' shares of the benefits are established following the employee's
death and, after the initial 400 weeks, those shares are not recalculated to account for dependents
who become ineligible to receive benefits on their eighteenth birthday. Chinault v. Pike Elec. Con-
tractors, 53 N.C. App. 604, 606, 281 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1981), aft'd, 306 N.C. 286, 293 S.E.2d 147
(1982).
49. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 97-39.
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The Act defines a child as follows: "The term 'child' shall include a posthumous
child, a child legally adopted prior to the injury to the employee, and a stepchild
or acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased, but does not
include married children unless wholly dependent upon him."' 5 0
Over time, several rules of statutory construction have been applied to the
Act. Probably the rule most often repeated is that the Act "should be liberally
construed, whenever appropriate, so that benefits will not be denied upon mere
technicalities or strained and narrow interpretations of its provisions." 51 This
maxim has been applied to further the humanitarian purposes of worker's com-
pensation 52 in cases in which a less generous construction would deny benefits to
needy claimants.5 3 This policy of liberal construction is limited, however, by
another time honored rule of construction: "liberality should not, however, ex-
tend beyond the clearly expressed language of those provisions, and our courts
may not enlarge the ordinary meaning of the terms used by the legislature or
engage in any method of 'judicial legislation' ... -54 In keeping with this doc-
trine, North Carolina courts have refused to expand the language of the statute
in some cases, even though the result for the individual claimant may have been
harsh.55 In one recent case the North Carolina Supreme Court attributed the
50. Id. § 97-2(12). The structure of the Act's system for distributing death benefits, including
the classes of beneficiaries, the conclusive presumption, and the definition of child, has remained
largely unchanged since the Act was enacted in 1929. See Act of March 11, 1929, ch. 120, §§ 97-
2(12), -38, -39, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 117, 133 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-2(12), -38, -39).
51. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 38, 326 S.E.2d at 69 (quoting Deese v. Lawn and Tree Expert
Co., 306 N.C. 275, 277, 293 S.E.2d 140, 142-43 (1982)). For other recitations of this rule, see Wat-
kins v. City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 282, 225 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1976); Graham v. Wall, 220,
N.C. 84, 91, 16 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1941); Reeves v. Parker-Graham-Sexton, Inc., 199 N.C. 236, 239,
154 S.E.2d 66, 67 (1930). Other states also construe their worker's compensation statutes liberally.
2 A. LARSON, supra note 41, § 62.21(c), at 11-9.
52. Two articulations of this purpose are "to relieve against hardship," Kellams v. Carolina
Metal Products Co., 248 N.C. 199, 203, 102 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1958), and "to compel industry to take
care of its own wreckage," Barber v. Minges, 223 N.C. 213, 216, 25 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1943).
53. See, eg., Hewett v. Garret, 274 N.C. 356, 163 S.E.2d 372 (1968) (acknowledged illegitimate
child who had not received support for five years prior to death of his father held "dependent," and
thus qualified for presumption of being wholly dependent as a "child"); Thomas v. Raleigh Gas Co.,
218 N.C. 429, 11 S.E.2d 297 (1940) (decedent's mother held wholly dependent even though she had
some limited earnings of her own); Reeves v. Parker-Graham-Sexton, Inc., 199 N.C. 236, 154 S.E.2d
66 (1930) (deceased left no dependents, therefore his estate was entitled to receive his death benefits).
54. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 38, 326 S.E.2d at 69 (quoting Deese v. Lawn and Tree Expert
Co., 306 N.C. 275, 277, 293 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1982)). The Court identified other rules of construc-
tion that are traditionally applied to the Act:
[Because] it is not reasonable to assume that the legislature would leave an important mat-
ter regarding the administration of the Act open to inference or speculation... the judici-
ary should avoid "ingrafting upon a law something that has been omitted, which [it]
believes ought to have been embraced." ... [I]n all cases of doubt, the intent of the legisla-
ture regarding the operation of a particular provision is to be discerned from a considera-
tion of the Act as a whole-its language, purposes, and spirit.... [Finally, the Industrial
Commission's legal interpretation of a particular provision is persuasive, although not
binding, and should be accorded some weight on appeal ....
Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 38, 326 S.E.2d at 69 (quoting Deese v. Lawn and Tree Expert Co., 306
N.C. 275, 277-78, 293 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1982)).
55. See, eg., Coleman v. City of Winston-Salem, 57 N.C. App. 137, 291 S.E.2d 155 (decedent's
partially dependent, acknowledged illegitimate child presumed wholly dependent and, therefore, en-
titled to all benefits to the exclusion of decedent's partially dependent parents), disc. rev. denied, 306
N.C. 382, 294 S.E.2d 206 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1112 (1983); Carpenter v. Tony E. Hauley,
Contractors, 53 N.C. 715, 281 S.E.2d 783 (1981) (decedent's acknowledged illegitimate child, under
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seemingly inequitable results that the Act sometimes produces to the "inherent
variety of life itself," rather than to the structure of the Act's system of benefit
distribution.5 6 Claimants have challenged the constitutionality of the Act on
equal protection grounds, but these challenges have been rejected.5 7 The
supreme court has suggested that any inequity that might exist "is a matter for
the legislature to consider and correct, if it be so inclined."58
Until Winstead, no North Carolina appellate court had been called on to
determine the requirements a stepchild must meet to be presumed wholly depen-
dent under the Act.5 9 In Chinault v. Pike Electrical Contractors60 a stepchild
was allowed to share in death benefits with a decedent's natural children. The
stepchild's right to receive benefits, however, was not at issue in the case. The
Winstead court in reviewing Chinault was "unable to determine the interpreta-
tion of the Act on which [the Commission] based its award to the stepchild" and
therefore, declined to accord plaintiff any precedential value on the question of
the proper interpretation of the statute's dependency requirements. 6 1
In Winstead the North Carolina Court of Appeals divided its analysis of the
Act's dependency requirements for stepchildren into two issues: whether a
stepchild must establish that he or she was dependent on the decedent to qualify
as a child, as defined in section 97-2(12), and if so, what degree of dependency is
required.
The Commission awarded benefits to Chad and Ronald because, under its
interpretation of the Act, deceased employees' stepchildren are presumed wholly
dependent regardless of their degree of factual dependence. In advocating this
position before the court of appeals, Chad and Ronald argued that in section 97-
2(12), which states that "[tihe term child shall include ... a stepchild or ac-
knowledged illegitimate child dependent on the deceased... ,",62 the word "de-
pendent" does not modify the word "stepchild. '63 The court rejected this
eighteen years of age, entitled to all benefits to the exclusion of other acknowledged illegitimate child
who reached eighteen less than two months before her father's death), disc. rev. denied, 304 N.C.
587, 289 S.E.2d 564 (1981); Bass v. Mooresville Mills, 11 N.C. App. 631, 182 S.E.2d 246 (1971)
(widow who was living separately from decedent pursuant to a separation agreement was not al-
lowed to show justiflable cause for separation, even though the separation was allegedly due to physi-
cal abuse by her husband), cert. denied, 281 N.C. 755, 191 S.E.2d 353 (1972).
56. Deese v. Lawn and Tree Expert Co., 306 N.C. 275, 282, 293 S.E.2d 140, 145 (1982).
57. Coleman V. City of Winston-Salem, 57 N.C. App. 137,141-42, 291 S.E. 2d 155, 157-58,
disc. rev. denied, 306 N. C. 382, 294 S.E. 2d 206 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1112 (1983); Carpen-
ter v. Tony E. Hauley, Contractors, Inc., 53 N.C. App. 715, 721-22, 281 S.E.2d 783, 787, disc. rev.
denied, 304 N.C. 587, 289 S.E. 2d 564 (1981).
58. Deese, 306 N.C. at 282, 293 S.E.2d at 145.
59. To determine these requirements, the court in Winstead had to interpret §§ 97-2(12), -38,
-39 of the Act. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 37-38, 326 S.E.2d at 68-69.
60. 53 N.. App. 604, 281 S.E.2d 460 (1981), aff'd, 306 N.C. 286, 293 S.E.2d 147 (1982).
61. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 41, 326 S.E.2d at 71. At issue in Chinault was whether the share
of death benefits awarded to a dependent child should be redistributed among the other dependents
when that child became ineligible to receive benefits on his eighteenth birthday. Chinault, 53 N.C.
App. at 605, 281 S.E.2d at 461. The Commission's award to the stepchild was uncontested and was
based on its finding that the stepchild was wholly dependent as a matter of fact and its conclusion of
law that all the claimants were "actually and or presumptively dependent on the deceased." Id. at
605-06, 281 S.E.2d at 461-62.
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(12).
63. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 40-41, 326 S.E.2d at 70.
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position on two grounds. First, it noted that the phrase in section 97-2(12) ap-
pears between two commas and found that under a normal grammatical inter-
pretation of the statutory language, "dependent" modifies "stepchild." 64
Second, the court pointed out that under the Commission's view all stepchildren
would be presumed wholly dependent and, therefore, stepchildren would receive
benefits in every case. 65 The court stated that this result would be inconsistent
with the general assembly's purpose to provide benefits to the people who had
relied on the decedent for financial support. 66
Although it rejected Chad and Ronald's contention that the Act requires no
dependence at all, the court was also unwilling to accept Melanie's argument
that the Act imposes a requirement of legal dependence. 67 Melanie first argued
that because the statute abrogated the common-law rule that a stepparent has no
duty to support a stepchild, it should be strictly construed. Melanie also argued
that the rule requiring a liberal construction of the Act applies only to liability
questions and does not apply to issues involving distribution of assets among
competing claimants. 68
The first of these arguments is in direct contradiction to precedent.
Although statutes that abrogate the common law, such as the Act, generally are
strictly construed, 69 North Carolina courts have recognized that the Act is a
remedial measure intended to be substituted for the common law and thus must
be interpreted liberally to achieve its purpose.70 "The statutes creating [work-
ers' compensation] . . . are superior to the common law in those respects in
which they can and do, amend or abrogate it. There is no presumption of super-
iority in the common law where they seem to clash."'7 1 The court also rejected
64. Id. at 41, 326 S.E.2d at 71.
65. Id. The court noted that persons in each class described under § 97-2(12), except for natu-
ral children, are subject to some additional requirement before they may qualify as a "child:" "adop-
tion must be completed before the injury proximately causing death, illegitimate children must be
acknowledged and dependent, and married children must be 'wholly dependent' on the deceased."
Id. at 39, 326 S.E.2d at 70. The word "stepchildren," appearing as it does in the middle of a list of
categories subject to limitations and in the clause "stepchildren and acknowledged illegitimate chil-
dren dependent upon the deceased," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(12), lends itself to this interpretation.
66. This interpretation is consistent with the court's analysis of the legislative intent behind the
statute, "to afford the conclusive presumption of dependency to those persons who would most
usually be factually dependent upon the deceased." Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 40, 326 S.E.2d at 70.
A natural child is more likely to be wholly, factually dependent on his or her parents than a
stepchild is likely to be wholly, factually dependent on his or her stepparents. Therefore, requiring a
stepchild to show some degree of dependency to qualify for the presumption brings the effect of the
statute more closely in line with the intent of the general assembly.
67. Id. at 40, 326 S.E.2d at 70.
68. Id. at 38, 326 S.E.2d at 69.
69. Wilmington Shipyard, Inc. v. North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n, 6 N.C. App. 649, 651,
171 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1969).
70. Deese v. Lawn and Tree Expert Co., 306 N.C. 275, 277, 293 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1982) (Dur-
ing the 400 week eligibility period of § 97-38, when a dependent who is receiving benefits becomes
ineligible to continue receiving them, his or her share is redistributed among the other claimants.);
Hewett v. Garret, 274 N.C. 356, 163 S.E.2d 372 (1968) (acknowledged illegitimate child who had
not received support for five years prior to the employee's death qualified for the presumption of
being wholly dependent). Applying a liberal construction to issues concerning distribution of bene-
fits is consistent with the policy of worker's compensation. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying
text.
71. Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 208, 60 S.E.2d 106, 112 (1950).
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Melanie's second argument summarily, citing Deese v. Lawn and Tree Expert
Co.72 and Hewett v. Garret73 as cases in which courts applied a liberal standard
of interpretation to issues of distribution.74
Melanie argued that in previous cases in which a claimant's qualifications
for the presumption of dependency were at issue, North Carolina courts have
interpreted the Act to require legal dependency. In support of this argument,
Melanie quoted Lippard v. Express Co. :7 "The dependency which the statute
recognizes as the basis of the right of the child to compensation grows out of the
relationship, which in itself imposes upon the father the duty to support the
child, and confers upon the child the right to support by its father."' 76 The
Lippard court wrote this language to support an award to an acknowledged
illegitimate child who was born after his father's death. 77 The court held that
the legal relationship between the decedent and his illegitimate child was enough
to qualify the child for benefits despite his lack of actual dependency.78
The court reached a similar decision in Hewett v. Garret,79 in which it
awarded benefits to an acknowledged illegitimate child even though he had not
received support from the decedent for five years prior to the decedent's death.
The court held that legal dependency was "sufficient" to qualify the child for the
presumption of dependency even though the claimant was not factually depen-
dent.80 In neither Lippard nor Hewett did the court suggest that legal depen-
dency is required for a child to qualify for the presumption of dependency.
Rather, each court merely held that legal dependency is sufficient to qualify a
child for the presumption.
Melanie cited three other types of cases in which she claimed courts had
interpreted the Act to require legal dependency as a condition for the presump-
tion of dependency: 81 a case in which a widow was living separately from the
deceased pursuant to a separation agreement,82 a case involving claims by a
common-law wife,83 and a case involving claims by the child of a common-law
wife.84 Although the courts in these cases applied a legal dependency standard,
the distinction between factual and legal dependency was not directly at issue,
72. 306 N.C. 275, 293 S.E.2d 140 (1982).
73. 274 N.C. 356, 163 S.E.2d 372 (1968).
74. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 38-39, 326 S.E.2d at 70.
75. 207 N.C. 507, 177 S.E. 801 (1935).
76. Id. at 509, 177 S.E. at 802, quoted in Claimant-Appellant's Brief at 6, Winstead.
77. Lippard, 207 N.C. at 508, 177 S.E. at 801.
78. Id. at 509, 177 S.E. at 802.
79. Hewett v. Garret, 274 N.C. 356, 163 S.E.2d 372 (1968).
80. Id. at 360, 163 N.C. at 375 (emphasis added).
81. Claimant-Appellant's Brief at 7-8, Winstead.
82. Id. at 7 (citing Bass v. Mooresville Mills, 11 N.C. App. 631, 634, 182 S.E.2d 246, 248(1971), cert. denied, 281 N.C. 755, 191 S.E.2d 353 (1972) (wife of decedent who was living apart
from him pursuant to a separation agreement was not allowed to argue that she was separated from
the decedent for just cause to be held entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act).
83. Claimant-Appellant's Brief at 7, Winstead (Citing Fields v. Hollowell, 238 N.C. 614, 620,
78 S.E.2d 740, 744 (1953), in which decedent's common-law wife was denied benefits because "such
a claim is conceived in sin and shapened in iniquity.")
84. Claimant-Appellant's Brief at 8, Winstead (citing Wilson v. Utah Constr. Co., 243 N.C. 96,
98-99, 89 S.E.2d 864, 867 (1955) (absent acknowledged paternity, son of common-law wife of de-
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and the cases were decided on other grounds. 85 Thus, their precedential value is
limited.
Rather than distinguish each of the cases that Melanie cited, the court re-
jected her interpretation of the Act on the basis of the consequences that would
result if legal dependency were a requirement for the presumption. The court
noted that a stepchild in North Carolina has no legal right to support from a
stepparent.8 6 Therefore, the court concluded that "[t]he argument fails under
its own logic" because it could "envision no practical set of circumstances under
which a stepchild could be legally dependent upon the stepparent short of legal
adoption."' 87 Under Melanie's interpretation, the language of section 97-2(12)
that provides a conclusive presumption of dependency to a "stepchild ... depen-
dent upon the deceased" 88 would be pointless because no such individuals ex-
ist.89 The general assembly specifically included stepchildren in the statutory
definition of "child" in section 97-2(12), and this specific inclusion cannot be
reconciled with an interpretation of that section which makes it impossible for a
stepchild to be a "child" for the purposes of the Act. 90
The court's holding that the Act does not require a stepchild to be legally
dependent to qualify for the presumption is also supported by its analysis of the
legislative purpose behind the definition of "child" in section 97-2(12). The
court noted the classes of persons that the Act presumes to be wholly dependent
as a "child:" (1) children legally adopted prior to the employee's injury, (2)
dependent stepchildren, (3) dependent, acknowledged illegitimate children, and
(4) wholly dependent, married children.9 1 It concluded that the general assem-
bly's intent in granting the presumption to these classes was "to afford the con-
clusive presumption of dependency to those persons who would most usually be
factually dependent upon the deceased thereby alleviating the burdensome re-
quirement of proof of dependency in every case." 92 Substantially dependent
stepchildren are among those "who would most usually be factually dependent
upon the deceased," and to force them to prove they are factually wholly
ceased employee denied benefits on grounds that decedent's illicit relationship with the child's
mother did not create any legal obligation to support the child)).
85. In Wilson v. Utah Constr. Co., 243 N.C. 96, 89 S.E.2d 864 (1955), and Fields v. Hollowell,
238 N.C. 614, 78 S.E.2d 748 (1953), the decisions to deny benefits rested on the illicit nature of the
relationships involved and the court's reluctance to reward such relationships. In Bass v. Moores-
ville Mills, 11 N.C. App. 631, 182 S.E.2d 246 (1972), the issue was whether the claimant who was
living apart from her husband pursuant to a valid separation agreement could argue that she was
living apart for just cause to qualify for benefits as a "widow" as defined in North Carolina General
Statutes § 97-2(14).
86. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 40, 326 S.E.2d at 70.
87. Id.
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(12).
89. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 40, 326 S.E.2d at 70.
90. "'In seeking to discover and give effect to the legislative intent, an act must be considered
as a whole, and none of its provisions shall be deemed useless or redundant ....... Stevenson v. City
of Durham, 281 N.C. 300, 303, 188 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1972) (quoting State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 19,
187 S.E.2d 706, 718 (1972)).
91. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 37-38, 326 S.E.2d at 69. For the language of § 97-2(12), see
supra note 15.
92. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 40, 326 S.E.2d at 70.
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dependent in each case would be inconsistent with the purpose behind the
presumption.
Having determined that section 97-2(12) requires that a stepchild be factu-
ally dependent to qualify as a "child" for the purposes of the Act, the court was
forced to develop some method for deciding whether Chad and Ronald had re-
ceived enough support from Mr. Winstead to be considered dependent on him.93
As the court noted, the Act merely states that stepchildren must be "depen-
dent." a9 4 In contrast, whenever claimants must be wholly dependent under the
Act, the general assembly used the specific term "wholly dependent."95' The
absence of such language in reference to stepchildren strongly suggests that
something less than total dependency is required. Rather than create any pre-
cise formula for determining whether a stepchild has been sufficiently dependent
to qualify for the presumption, the court held that a stepchild has the burden of
establishing "substantial dependency."'96
The facts of Winstead made it unnecessary for the court to define the stan-
dard any further.97 The five factors in the court's substantial dependency test
are, in essence, a listing of the four most likely sources from which a stepchild
might have received support, and a catch-all category that accounts for "any
other funds regularly received."' 98 Although this test is helpful in determining a
stepchild's degree of dependency on the decedent, it does little to establish what
degree of dependency should be considered substantial. Perhaps it is most accu-
rate for the existence of substantial dependence "to be determined under the
facts of each case." 99 If the Commission is to accurately decide whether sub-
stantial dependency exists in a given case, however, the courts must provide
some guidance as to what level of dependency is "substantial."
During the fifty-six years the Workers' Compensation Act has been in
force, the question of what level of dependency a stepchild must demonstrate in
order to be presumed wholly dependent had never been raised before an appel-
late court until Winstead.100 Winstead established that the Act does not require
stepchildren to be legally dependent to qualify for the presumption. In light of
this clarification of the statutory provisions regarding stepchildren, the question
naturally arises whether the general assembly was wise to write the Act in this
way.
The substantial dependency test created by Winstead is more compatible
with the policies of the Act than a requirement of legal dependency would be.
The presumption of dependency is given to spouses and children to allow those
93. Id. at 41, 326 S.E.2d at 71.
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(12).
95. "The term 'wholly dependent,' therefore, is a term of art as employed by the General As.
sembly .. " Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 42, 326 S.E.2d at 71.
96. Id.
97. Because the court found that the stepchildren had been 84% dependent during the last year
of their stepfather's life, id. at 43, 326 S.E.2d at 72, the case did not provide a significant test of the
boundaries of substantial dependence.
98. Id. at 42, 326 S.E.2d at 71. For a list of the factors, see supra note 27.
99. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 42, 326 S.E.2d at 71.
100. Id. at 37, 326 S.E.2d at 68.
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persons most likely to have been factually dependent on the deceased employee
to obtain relief quickly by excusing them from the burdensome process of prov-
ing dependency.10 1 The Act excuses legitimate children, widows, and widowers
from the requirement of proving dependency to qualify for the presumption,10 2
ostensibly because the likelihood they were wholly dependent on the decedent is
so strong as to make any evidentiary requirement more costly than it is worth.
Apparently, the North Carolina General Assembly presumed that stepchildren
are not as likely to have been wholly dependent and elected to require them to
show they were dependent on the decedent to qualify to be presumed wholly
dependent. Once a stepchild has proven that he or she was substantially depen-
dent on the deceased employee, the likelihood that the stepchild was wholly
dependent is as high as the likelihood that members of the other classes were
wholly dependent.' 0 3 The primary benefit of the presumption-that it "effectu-
ates the Act's goal of swift and certain awards of benefits" 1----is equally served
when the presumption is applied to stepchildren as when it is applied to other
classes.
In those cases in which the presumption works to allow stepchildren who
are not wholly dependent to receive benefits, it fulfills much the same role as the
rule mandating that the Act be liberally construed.10 5 The hardship endured by
a needy claimant is just as great when the claimant is denied benefits because of
a narrow construction of the Act's dependency requirements as when they are
denied because of a narrow construction of its rules concerning liability. The
harm that could result from an overly generous construction of the Act in favor
of stepchildren is that other dependents of a deceased stepparent will receive
smaller awards.10 6 Workers' compensation is meant to alleviate hardship and
was never intended to provide full compensation for claimants' losses. 10 7 Ac-
cordingly, it is more in keeping with the legislative intent to err on the side of
providing lesser benefits to a greater number of claimants than on the side of
denying benefits to stepchildren who were substantially dependent on the
decedent.108
101. The Winstead court derived this interpretation of the general assembly's purpose from the
nature of the classes to which the presumption is granted: (1) natural children, (2) adopted children,
(3) dependent, acknowledged illegitimate children, and (4) dependent stepchildren. Id. at 39-40, 326
S.E.2d at 70. The court considered these to be the classes of claimants who would "most usually be
factually dependent on the deceased." Id.
102. Id.
103. It is apparent that the general assembly thought so, because it included them in the class
entitled to the presumption along with widows, widowers, and natural children. In evaluating the
validity of the presumption as a predictor of the dependence of stepchildren, it is important to re-
member that the statute also applies a presumption of dependency to natural children and spouses,
even though the presumptive result is not always accurate for those classes either.
104. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 40, 326 S.E.2d at 70.
105. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
106. This is true because the total fund from which benefits are distributed is set at 66.66% of
the decedent's weekly wages and does not vary according to the number of claimants who share in
the award. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-38 (1985).
107. Deese, 306 N.C. at 281, 293 S.E.2d at 145.
108. This statement is not meant to suggest that dependents who are forced to live on their
portion of 66.66% of the decedent's weekly wage are not in need of the full share of the benefits to
which they are entitled. However, allowing a stepchild who was substantially dependent on the
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Melanie's attack on the Commission's decision was not limited to issues of
statutory construction. Melanie also attacked the Commission's decision on
constitutional grounds,' 09 claiming that allowing stepchildren who are not le-
gally dependent to recover under the Act is a violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution' 1 0 and its
counterpart in the North Carolina Constitution."' This argument is based on
the potential for double recovery that would exist if stepchildren are allowed to
receive benefits on the death of their stepparent and are still presumed wholly
dependent on their natural parents.1 12 The court dismissed this argument with-
out explanation, relying on two cases from other jurisdictions that it found to be
directly on point.1 13
The court's holding that the possibility of double recovery for stepchildren
is not a denial of equal protection to natural children is easily supportable. In
previous cases in which the constitutionality of the statutory presumption has
been challenged, courts have applied a standard of scrutiny requiring that "to
withstand an equal protection claim, a legislative classification must be reason-
able, must not be arbitrary, and must rest on some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation." ' 1 4 Application
decedent to obtain an equal portion of the award will lead to a distribution in which each claimant
will receive a share of the benefits that is closer to the share of the deceased employee's income he or
she received while the employee was alive. Denying benefits to a substantially dependent stepchild
might force the state to shoulder the burden of replacing the substantial support the stepchild had
previously received from the decedent. The other claimants would benefit merely because their sib-
lings are stepchildren rather than natural children.
Although workers' compensation is not intended as a substitute for life insurance, see id., the
benefits often represent a significant portion of the funds available to the dependents of a deceased
employee. Another factor that militates in favor of the presumption that the Act extends to stepchil-
dren is that the distribution it produces is likely to parallel that which the employee would have
chosen if he had had the opportunity to choose how the benefits would be distributed. By definition,
those stepchildren who are granted the presumption are people who the employee voluntarily chose
to support during his or her life. Whatever motives lead the employee to choose to provide substan-
tial support to the stepchild during the employee's life, whether they be emotional, moral, or even
charitable, it is only reasonable to believe that those same motivations would lead the employee to
prefer that the stepchild share in the death benefits. That the current system, as interpreted in
Winstead, distributes benefits to the people the worker chose to support during his or her life is a
strong policy argument for this interpretation.
109. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 43, 326 S.E.2d at 72.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
111. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
112. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 43, 326 S.E.2d at 72. Under the court's ruling in Winstead, a
stepchild who is factually dependent on his or her stepparent would receive death benefits on the
death of the stepparent, and if one of the child's natural parents was later involved in a compensable
accident, the child would be presumed wholly dependent as a natural child and recover again.
113. Id. The court cited Flint River Mills v. Henry, 239 Ga. 347, 350, 236 S.E.2d 583, 585
(1977) (upholding statute providing conclusive presumption of dependence to stepchildren), appeal
dismissed, 434 U.S. 1003 (1978), and Shahan v. Beasley Hot Shot Service, 91 N.M. 462, 465, 575
P.2d 1347, 1350 (1978) (award of share in death benefits to deceased employee's three stepchildren
upheld against argument that it invidiously discriminated against decedent's natural children).
114. Carpenter v. Tony E. Hauley, Contractors, 53 N.C. App. 715, 721-22, 281 S.E.2d 783, 787,
disc rev. denied, 304 N.C. 587, 289 S.E.2d 564 (1981). In Carpenter an acknowledged illegitimate
child was denied death benefits because she reached 18 years of age less than 2 months before the
death of her father and because she was supported by her grandparents and thus was not a depen-
dent of the deceased. The court rejected her contention that the statutory system for distributing
death benefits arbitrarily established a special class of persons wholly dependent on the deceased in
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.; see also Coleman v. City
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of the presumption to dependent stepchildren helps to accomplish "[o]ne of the
primary purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act," because in alleviating the
need for expensive, time-consuming evidentiary hearings, it helps to "grant cer-
tain and speedy relief" to the decedent's dependents.1 1 5 To dependents who
have lost their source of support, a slow and "costly remedy is no remedy at
all." 116 In light of the variety of family circumstances that exist in society, it is
unlikely that any classification system could be devised that would provide bene-
fits to those most deserving of them in every case. The general assembly is enti-
tled to exercise its judgment to create a system of distribution reasonably related
to the objectives of the Act. 117 A system of presumptions that brings about
more expedient, less costly relief by eliminating the need for the expense and
delay of a full-scale, fact-finding procedure can hardly be said to bear no sub-
stantial relationship to the objective of the legislation.
Winstead unequivocally settled the issue whether a stepchild who is not
legally dependent may qualify for the presumption of section 97-29. The test
Winstead established for determining which stepchildren qualify for the pre-
sumption is not as clear, however, and the court of appeals' opinion provides
little guidance on where courts should draw the line. When, as in Winstead, the
stepchildren have been eight-four percent and sixty-nine percent dependent on
the deceased during the last two years of his life,118 a finding of substantial de-
pendency was easy to justify.
It is simple, however, to imagine a variety of circumstances in which the
decision might not be so obvious. The term "substantial" does not suggest a
requirement of a degree of factual dependency even approaching total depen-
dency.' 19 Under the Winstead test, "[t]he ultimate question of fact to be deter-
mined is whether the stepchild was substantially dependent on the financial
support of the deceased stepparent.., to maintain his accustomed standard of
living." 120 Arguably, a stepchild could receive a significant amount of support
of Winston-Salem, 57 N.C. App. 137, 291 S.E.2d 155 (applying same standard to reject constitu-
tional argument against application of presumption that an acknowledged illegitimate child is wholly
dependent so that he received all the benefits to the exclusion of decedent's partially dependent
parents), disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 382, 294 S.E.2d 206 (1982), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 1112 (1983).
115. Carpenter, 53 N.C. App. at 721-22, 281 S.E.2d at 787.
116. J. KEECH, supra note 32, at 43; see Flint River Mills v. Henry, 239 Ga. 347, 236 S.E.2d 583
(1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 1003 (1978). In Flint the Georgia Supreme Court overruled the
trial court's holding that a conclusive presumption of dependency was unconstitutional. The Flint
Court's holding supports an even broader view of the constitutionality of such a presumption than
the holding in Winstead because the Georgia statute conclusively presumed all stepchildren wholly
dependent without requiring them to first establish substantial dependency.
117. Flint River Mills, 239 Ga. at 349, 236 S.E.2d at 585.
118. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 43, 326 S.E.2d at 72.
119. Substantial is defined as "[s]omething worthwhile as distinguished from something without
value or merely nominal.... Synonymous with material." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1280 (5th
ed. 1979).
Even when worker's compensation acts require a showing of factual dependency, the general
rule is that "[a] showing of actual dependency does not require proof that, without decedent's contri-
butions, claimant would have lacked the necessities of life, but only that decedent's contributions
were relied on by claimant to maintain claimant's accustomed mode of living." 2 A. LARSON, supra
note 41, § 63.11, at 11-99.
120. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 42, 326 S.E.2d at 71 (emphasis added).
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from other sources and still be substantially dependent on the decedent to
"maintain his accustomed standard of living." 121 Under the Act, as interpreted
by Winstead, a stepchild who just barely meets the substantial dependency stan-
dard is entitled to share equally in the death benefits with a natural child who is
factually wholly dependent, or even to receive the entire award to the exclusion
of all persons partially dependent on the deceased.122 The stepchild need only
have been substantially dependent for three months preceding the accident that
caused the employee's death to qualify for the presumption. 123 Furthermore,
the factors set out in Winstead account for "the actual amount and consistency
of the support derived by the stepchild from" all sources.1 24 The factors do not
take into account the possibility that the stepchild's natural parent may be able
to provide more support than he or she actually provided during the stepparent's
life or the existence of other potential sources of support from which the
stepchild did not receive support before the stepparent's death. Thus, given the
current Act and the substantial dependency test established in Winstead, a
stepchild who has been partially dependent on the stepparent for only a short
time, who receives a significant amount of support from his or her natural par-
ent, and whose natural parent is capable of providing full support, could share
benefits equally with wholly dependent children or receive the full benefits to the
exclusion of all partially dependent claimants.
There can be little doubt that in some situations the application of a conclu-
sive presumption that dependent stepchildren are wholly dependent will lead to
anomalous results. Cases will arise in which an abstract sense of justice strongly
tempts a court to ignore the language of the Act and distribute benefits on equi-
table principles. Although applying equitable principles may lead to salutary
results in a given case, allowing a court to deviate from the statutory presump-
tions in distributing benefits or even allowing claimants to argue for an equitable
distribution may destroy the very advantages-speed and certainty of recov-
ery-that the system is designed to provide.
On its face, Winstead's five factor test for substantial dependency 125 consid-
ers only the relatively clear cut factual question of what sources have supported
the claimant in the past. The court's interpretation of the statute is well sup-
ported by both the statutory language and policy, and is difficult to challenge as
an accurate interpretation of the current statute. A danger exists, however, that
121. A person from whom a claimant receives 50% of his or her financial support could reason-
ably be considered a substantial source of support for that claimant. The loss of 50% of a person's
total resources would certainly have more than a "merely nominal" effect on their economic condi-
tion and would make it impossible for that person to maintain their "accustomed standard of living."
See id.
122. Under the Act
Persons wholly dependent for support upon the earnings of the deceased employee at the
time of the accident shall be entitled to receive the entire compensation payable share and
share alike to the exclusion of all other persons. If there be only one person wholly depen-
dent then that person shall receive the entire compensation payable.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-38(1).
123. Id. § 97-39.
124. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 42, 326 S.E.2d at 71.
125. See supra note 27.
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the Commission and the courts will either expand the test to account for the
family circumstances of the decedent or other equitable considerations, or will
address these equitable factors sub silentio under the guise of applying the
test.12 6 The court's admonition that the test "is a question of fact to be deter-
mined under the facts of each case" 127 could be interpreted as an invitation to
engage in this type of expansive inquiry. The very purpose of a presumption is
to alleviate the need for a detailed consideration of the circumstances of each
case. If a court allows equitable considerations to enter into its determination of
the distribution of benefits, the proceeding will be transformed from a limited
investigation of a few specific questions of fact into full-scale litigation with all
its accompanying disadvantages. 128 Failure to limit the scope of workers' com-
pensation cases to the specific issues raised by the statute has the potential to
destroy the procedural efficiency and certainty of results that are essential to the
effective operation of the system.
In the wake of Winstead, North Carolina's courts and the general assembly
face a difficult challenge: establishing boundaries for the substantial dependency
test that reconcile the conflicting goals of reaching equitable decisions in individ-
ual cases and providing efficient and certain results in all cases. A legislative
refinement of the statute might provide greater certainty, but any changes that
would provide certainty would limit the ability of the courts to remedy even the
most egregious results. It is unlikely that a statute could perform the fine bal-
ancing required by the delicate relationship between efficiency and fairness. 129
The balancing of these interests in individual cases is a task best left to the
courts. In exercising their judgment in this area, however, courts should be
mindful of the danger to all workers' compensation claimants each time a case is
decided on the basis of factors beyond the scope of the Act. Courts should re-
tain some flexibility to consider factors beyond the claimants' historic sources of
income, but should exercise that discretion only in the most extreme cases. The
temptation may be strong to reach the fairest result in each case, but the goal of
the system is "to relieve against hardship rather than to afford full compensation
126. Examples of the type of factors a court might consider relevant to an equitable distribution
of benefits include: Whether the stepchild's natural parent who was not the decedent's spouse is
living, the natural parent's financial condition, the likelihood that the natural parent will voluntarily
assume responsibility for the child's support, and the closeness of the stepchild's relationships with
the decedent and the decedent's natural children.
127. Winstead, 73 N.C. App. at 42, 326 S.E.2d at 71.
128. If a court elects to weigh and balance factors outside the scope of the statute, it will be
forced into a full-scale investigation of all relevant facts and circumstances to determine where the
equities lie. If it becomes apparent that an appellate court may apply extra-statutory considerations
to overrule a decision that the Commission has made based on a strict application of the language of
the statute, all claimants will be encouraged to introduce evidence on extra-statutory matters and to
argue for equitable relief. Hearings before the Commissioner will be greatly complicated and numer-
ous appeals will be raised that otherwise would be foreclosed by the statute. The delay and uncer-
tainty that would result would significantly affect the ability of the worker's compensation system to
serve the needs of workers. "To necessitous claimants a costly remedy is no remedy at all. To a
disabled workman and his family delay itself is a denial ofjustice." J. KEECH, supra note 32, at 43.
129. That the general assembly intended for the courts to exercise some judgment over the level
of dependency required by the statute is evident from its failure to provide any more guidance than
the words "dependent upon the deceased." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(12) (1985).
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for injury," 130 and it is a necessary result of a system of presumptions that some
claimants will be denied the full measure of benefits they might receive in a
formal equitable proceeding. It is only by sacrificing exact results in these cases
that the system is able to provide the benefits for which it was created.
It is often said that workers' compensation systems are essentially a com-
promise. 131 Employers sacrifice the protections afforded by tort law, and in re-
turn, workers accept statutorily limited recoveries. 132  Through this
compromise, the parties sacrifice the accuracy of results produced by a ful-scale
determination of common-law liability in exchange for a system that provides
predictable results and brings quick relief against hardship. Through its system
of conclusive presumptions, the Act extends this basic concept of compromise to
the area of distribution of death benefits. Under North Carolina's system for
distributing death benefits, some claimants are forced to sacrifice the full extent
of the benefits they would receive if formal proof of total dependency were re-
quired of all claimants in return for escaping the enormous expense and delay
that such a process would entail.
This sacrifice of accuracy in some individual cases is constitutional because
it bears a fair and substantial relationship to the objectives of the legislation. 133
Whether it is wise or just, however, is measured by a stricter standard: whether
it is effective in achieving these goals. The Act's distribution system is based on
generalizations about hypothetical average families and, therefore, must neces-
sarily produce unfair results for some individuals. This injustice is the price
exacted in exchange for the benefits of swift and certain relief that accompany it
and is tolerable only because it is outweighed by the benefits that it procures. It
is impossible for North Carolina's courts to completely eliminate this potential
for injustice within the boundaries of the Act. It is possible, however, that if the
substantial dependency test is used as a means to eliminate injustice in individual
cases by allowing extra-statutory factors to affect the distribution of benefits, the
efficiency for which those injustices are tolerated could be destroyed.
The rule established in Winstead that stepchildren must prove substantial
dependence on the decedent to be presumed wholly dependent is an accurate
interpretation of the Act's requirements. The five factor test the court created
provides a comprehensive view of a stepchild's historic sources of support on
which his or her dependency can be determined. In applying this test, North
Carolina courts should confine themselves to the economic factors it identifies
and refrain from considering extraneous matters except in the most extreme sit-
130. Kellams v. Carolina Metal Products, 248 N.C. 199, 203, 102 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1958).
131. See, eg., Winslow v. Carolina Conference Ass'n, 211 N.C. 571, 579, 191 S.E. 403, 408
(1937); Bare v. Wayne Poultry Co., 70 N.C. App. 88, 92, 318 S.E.2d 534, 538 (1984), cert. denied,
312 N.C. 796, 325 S.E.2d 484 (1985).
132. E. CHErt, supra note 34, at 12; A. HONNOLD, supra note 39, § 2, at 11-12 & nn.13-14.
133. Carpenter v. Tony E. Hauley, Contractors, 53 N.C. App. 715, 721-22, 281 S.E.2d 783, 787,
disc. rev. denied, 304 N.C. 587, 289 S.E.2d 564 (1981).
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uations. Otherwise, workers' compensation claimants will be left with a system
that is neither just nor efficient.
JOEL ALAN FISCHMAN
Caulder v. Waverly Mills: Expanding the Definition of an
Occupational Disease Under the Last Injurious Exposure Rule
Assessing liability for occupational exposures that cause or aggravate
chronic lung diseases such a" asbestosis,I silicosis, 2 and chronic obstructive lung
disease3 has traditionally been problematic. Difficulty often arises because of the
numerous nonoccupational factors that might contribute to an employee's disa-
bility.4 Difficulty also arises because employees in the textile industry may work
for several employers, each of whom contributes to the disease and the em-
ployee's ultimate disability. In addressing this problem, jurisdictions generally
recognize one of two theories of liability-apportionment between each em-
ployer based on their respective contributions to the employee's disease,5 and the
last injurious exposure rule, which holds that the last employer to subject an
employee to harmful conditions is liable for the entire disability notwithstanding
the many employers whose work conditions contributed to the employee's dis-
ease. 6 North Carolina has expressly adopted the latter policy, providing in Gen-
1. A "characteristic fibrotic condition of the lungs caused by the inhalation of asbestos dust."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-62 (1985); see also Hatch, Pneumoconiosis, in 8 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE &
SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 226, 228-30 (1962) (identifying asbestosis as a type of
pneumoconiosis).
2. A "characteristic fibrotic condition of the lungs caused by the inhalation of dust of silica or
silicates." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-62 (1985); see also Hatch, supra note 1, at 227-28 (identifying
silicosis as a type of pneumoconiosis).
3. The term chronic obstructive lung disease describes a condition represented by a combina-
tion of diseases such as chronic bronchitis, emphysema, asthma, and byssinosis. AMERICAN LUNG
Ass'N, OCCUPATIONAL DIsEss-AN INTRODUCTION 14 (1979); see A. Bouhuys, J. Schoenberg,
G. Beck & R. Schilling, Epidemiology of Chronic Lung Disease in a Cotton Mill Community, in 5
TRAUMATIC MEDICINE & SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 607, 614-18 (serv. vol. 1978). In Rut-
ledge v. Tultex Corp./King's Yarn, 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983), the North Carolina
Supreme Court established that chronic obstructive lung disease is an occupational disease and does
not require a specific finding of byssinosis, the disease traditionally connected to cotton dust expo-
sure. Id. at 100-01, 301 S.E.2d at 369. For a discussion of the ramifications of labeling a plaintiffs
disease "chronic obstructive lung disease," see Note, Workers' Compensation -Rutledge v. Tultex
Corp./King's Yarn: Leaving Precedent in the Dust?, 62 N.C.L. REV. 573 (1984).
4. This problem is characterized as "dual causation" and typically arises when the individual
who develops byssinosis or chronic obstructive lung disease has smoked for much of his or her life
and has been exposed to cotton dust. Other nonoccupational factors include chronic bronchitis and
asthma. IB A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 41.64(a), at 7-465 (1986).
5. See 4 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 95.12, at 17-111; id. § 95.31. Professor Larson discusses
both apportionment and the last injurious exposure rule, see infra text accompanying note 6, as
different theories of rights between insurers. The theories also apply to successive employers who are
ultimately liable if they are not covered by an insurance company unless the jurisdiction applies a
different rule for successive employers than for successive insurers. Id. § 95.24, at 17-148 n.45.
Throughout this Note these theories are discussed in the employer context.
The concept of apportioning cause arises in dual causation cases, see supra note 4, if a jurisdic-
tion apportions one employer's liability between employment-related and nonemployment-related
causes of disability. The plaintiff receives no compensation for the portion of his or her disability
attributable to the nonemployment factors. See 4 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 41.64(d). See gener-
ally Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./King's Yarn, 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983) (in effect overruling
the earlier adoption of apportionment of cause in Burlington Indus. v. Morrison, 304 N.C. 1, 282
S.E.2d 458 (1981), by characterizing plaintiff's disease as "chronic obstructive lung disease" rather
than byssinosis).
6. 4 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 95.12, at 17-112; id. § 95.20; see Locke, Adapting Workers'
Compensation to the Special Problems of Occupational Diseases, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 249, 270-
71 (1985); Vokoun, Using the Last Exposure Rule in the Determination of Liability of Employers and
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eral Statutes section 97-57 that "the employer in whose employment the
employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of [the employee's occupa-
tional] disease, and the insurance carrier ... which was on the risk when the
employee was so last exposed under such employer, shall be liable."'7
Because an employee typically is exposed to the same hazardous conditions
while working for each employer, application of the last injurious exposure rule
usually is not difficult.8 The only relevant determination is. the degree of expo-
sure necessary to impose liability, including both the requisite length of exposure
to the harmful substance and the amount necessary to render such exposure
injurious. 9 Application of the last injurious exposure rule in the textile industry,
however, can be difficult. Although a textile employee is exposed to dust in each
employment, he or she might be exposed to two different kinds of dust-cotton
fiber dust, which has been proven to cause the development of lung disease,1 °
and synthetic fiber dust, which has not yet been shown to cause the disease. 1 In
these cases, therefore, before determining whether the requisite degree of expo-
sure exists, it must first be determined "whether exposure to a substance which
is not known to cause an occupational disease may nevertheless be a last injuri-
ous exposure to the hazards of such disease under N.C.G.S. § 97-57 if it makes
the disease, already in progress, worse." 12
In Caulder v. Waverly Mills 13 the North Carolina Supreme Court con-
cluded that exposure to synthetic fiber dust can indeed be a "last injurious expo-
sure" as contemplated by section 97-57.14 In a brief opinion the court
determined that because plaintiff's exposure to synthetic dust aggravated his
chronic lung disease, it was injurious despite the dust's inability to cause the
disease itself.15 The court also held that the synthetic fiber dust met the thresh-
old test of being a "hazard" of an "occupational" disease because it was peculiar
Insurers for Occupational Diseases, 20 A.B.A. FORUM 102, 104-05 (1984). See generally infra notes
63-67 and accompanying text (discussing the policy behind the last injurious exposure rule).
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-57 (1985).
8. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./King's Yarn, 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983); Wil-
lingham v. Bryan Rock & Sand Co., 240 N.C. 281, 82 S.E.2d 68 (1954); Haynes v. Feldspar Produc-
ing Co., 222 N.C. 163, 22 S.E.2d 275 (1942).
9. See 4 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 95.26. Generally, there must have been only some expo-
sure contributing to the condition, even if the period of exposure was relatively brief. A few jurisdic-
tions, however, require a substantial amount of exposure-exposure at the defendant's employment
to such a degree and for such a length of time that the substance could have caused the disease. Id.;
see, eg., Fluor Alaska, Inc. v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 614 P.2d 310 (Alaska 1980); Halverson v.
Larrivy Plumbing & Heating Co., 322 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. 1982).
In North Carolina there must be only a slight degree of exposure to find the last employer liable.
See, eg., Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./King's Yarn, 308 N.C. 85, 89, 301 S.E.2d 359, 362 (1983);
Haynes v. Feldspar Producing Co., 222 N.C. 163, 166, 22 S.E.2d 275, 277 (1942).
10. See, eg., Kilburn, Particles Causing Lung Disease, in 9 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE & SURGERY
FOR THE ATrORNEY 209, 214, 216 (serv. vol. 1985).
11. Caulder v. Waverly Mills, 314 N.C. 70, 72, 331 S.E.2d 646, 647 (1985); see Appellants'
Brief at 3, Caulder.
12. Caulder v. Waverly Mills, 314 N.C. 70, 72, 331 S.E.2d 646, 647 (1985).
13. 314 N.C. 70, 331 S.E.2d 646 (1985).
14. Id. at 76, 331 S.E.2d at 650.
15. Id.
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to plaintiff's workplace at Waverly Mills. 16
This Note analyzes the Caulder court's decision in light of existing North
Carolina law and policy. It points out that although the court's conclusions
comply with the literal language of some prior cases, the unique facts of Caulder
provided an opportunity for the court to examine some finer issues that the
court's brief opinion failed to address. The Note suggests that an examination of
the policies underlying the last injurious exposure statute and workers' compen-
sation generally supports a conclusion contrary to the majority's result. It con-
cludes that the general assembly should confront the problem of chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease and address the questions Caulder left
unanswered.
The facts in Caulder were uncontroverted. Clifton Caulder worked in the
textile industry from 1945 to 1980. Before beginning work for defendant
Waverly Mills in 1967, Caulder was exposed mainly to cotton dust. After he
joined Waverly Mills, however, he was exposed almost exclusively to synthetic
fiber dust.17 From July 1979 through February 1980, when insurer-defendant
Employers Mutual Insurance Company (Employers Mutual) was responsible for
paying Waverly Mills' workers' compensation obligations, Caulder was exposed
exclusively to synthetic fiber dust.18 When Caulder left Waverly Mills in Febru-
ary 1980 he was totally disabled. Before coming to work for that mill, however,
Caulder suffered from no physical incapacity. 19 Although synthetic fiber dust
was not proven to be a medical cause of plaintiff's disease, the expert medical
testimony indicated that plaintiff's exposure to the synthetic fiber dust at
Waverly Mills contributed to his ultimate disability by aggravating a pre-ex-
isting condition that probably had been caused by exposure to cotton dust.20
The North Carolina Industrial Commission concluded, and the court of appeals
affirmed, that Caulder suffered from chronic obstructive lung disease, that this
condition was an occupational disease under General Statutes section 97-53(13),
that this condition resulted in plaintiff's disability, and "that Caulder was last
injuriously exposed to the hazards of his disease while employed by Waverly
Mills and while Employers Mutual Insurance Company was on the risk. ... " 2 1
On appeal, defendants challenged only the finding that plaintiff was last injuri-
ously exposed during his employment at Waverly Mills, 2 2 claiming that expo-
16. Id. at 74-75, 331 S.E.2d at 649.
17. Id.
18. Id. Because textile mill employers change insurance carriers frequently, they must identify
which carrier was "on the risk" when plaintiff was last exposed to the harmful substance. See, e.g.,
Appellant's New Brief at 6-12, Caulder (defendant Employers Mutual claimed it was not the carrier
on the risk when Caulder was exposed to a harmful substance). An insurance company might be
liable as the carrier on the risk even if it had assumed coverage within the last 24 hours, if that was
when plaintiff was last exposed. See 4 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 95.26(a).
19. Calder, 314 N.C. at 76, 331 S.E.2d at 649.
20. Id. at 76, 331 S.E.2d at 649-50.
21. Id. at 76, 331 S.E.2d at 650 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 71-72, 331 S.E.2d at 647; Appellant's Brief at 8, Caulder. Although defendants also
claimed that Employers Mutual was not the carrier on the risk and that plaintiff was not injuriously
exposed at any time during his employment, this Note addresses only the situation in which an
employee is exposed exclusively to synthetic fiber dust by the last employer.
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sure to a substance that is not a medically accepted cause of a disease cannot be
a last injurious exposure.23
In an opinion written by Justice Exum, the North Carolina Supreme Court
rejected this claim, emphasizing the medical testimony that plaintiff's exposure
to dust while at Waverly Mills had aggravated his disease and thus had contrib-
uted to his disability. 24 The court recognized that to constitute a "last injurious
exposure," the degree of exposure to the harmful substance need only be slight,
as long as it "'proximately augmented the disease to any extent .... ' 2 Be-
cause the expert testimony clearly indicated that the exposure had aggravated
plaintiff's disease, the court concluded that his exposure to synthetic fiber dust
could be a "last injurious exposure."'2 6
After concluding that it was "satisfied that [by the phrase 'hazards of the
disease'] the legislature intended to include more than substances which are ca-
pable in themselves of producing an occupational disease,"'27 the court addressed
the specific question whether exposure to synthetic fiber dust could constitute a
hazard of an occupational disease under section 97-57. The court held that the
statute requires that the substance be "peculiar to the workplace" before the
employer responsible for the exposure can be liable.2 8 A substance is peculiar to
the workplace, the court added, if it is "one to which the worker has a greater
exposure on the job than does the public generally, either because of the nature
of the substance itself or because the concentrations of the substance in the
workplace are greater than concentrations to which the public generally is ex-
posed."'2 9 The synthetic fiber dust to which Caulder was exposed was a "haz-
ard" of the occupational disease, the court held, because it "is a substance to
which, because of its nature, workers in those plants [that process synthetic fi-
bers] have a greater exposure than does the public generally."'30
In a dissent joined by Chief Justice Branch, Justice Meyer argued that the
majority's analysis of whether synthetic fiber dust was "peculiar to the work-
place" went beyond the test traditionally used to identify an occupational dis-
ease under section 97-53(13).31 He asserted that the majority's determination
that greater concentrations of a substance could satisfy the requirement was too
broad because it could apply to high concentrations of ordinary substances.32
This loosening of the standard, Meyer argued, was unnecessary on the facts of
the case and could have "a far-reaching, detrimental impact on the employment
23. Appellant's New Brief at 13, Caulder; see Caulder, 314 N.C. at 71, 331 S.E.2d at 647.
24. Caulder, 314 N.C. at 76, 331 S.E.2d at 649-50.
25. Id. at 74, 331 S.E.2d at 648 (quoting Haynes v. Feldspar Producing Co., 222 N.C. 163, 166,
22 S.E.2d 275, 277 (1942)).
26. Id. at 76, 331 S.E.2d at 650.
27. Id. at 74, 331 S.E.2d at 649.
28. Id. at 74-75, 331 S.E.2d at 649.
29. Id. at 75, 331 S.E.2d at 649.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 77-78, 331 S.E.2d at 650 (Meyer, J., dissenting). For a discussion of § 97-53 (13), see
infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
32. Caulder, 314 N.C. at 79, 331 S.E.2d at 651 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
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opportunities for.., textile workers,"' 33 presumably because an employer with
dusty premises will hesitate to hire an employee who has spent a significant
amount of time in cotton mills.
The portion of North Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act covering oc-
cupational diseases 34 provides that occupational diseases are compensable under
the Act,35 provides a statutory list of prima facie occupational diseases, 36 and
designates which employers will be liable for an employee's disease. 37 Plaintiffs
suing under the last injurious exposure rule typically must first prove they suffer
from an occupational disease as defined in General Statutes section 97-53.38
Plaintiffs must then prove that they were last exposed to the hazards of the
disease at a particular defendant's premises. 39 Typically, once plaintiffs estab-
lish that they have an occupational disease, they need only prove that they were
exposed in the slightest degree to the harmful substance to satisfy the "last inju-
rious exposure" requirement. 4°
The Caulder court's conclusions arguably are in accord with such a statu-
tory analysis and with North Carolina precedent. North Carolina case law rec-
ognizes that employers must take their employees as they find them, even if
those employees have pre-existing conditions that substantially contribute to
subsequent disability.41 Although this concept usually has been applied in the
injury context and no occupational disease case has expressly analogized a pre-
existing disease to a pre-existing injury,42 the practice in North Carolina has
33. Id. at 80, 331 S.E.2d at 652 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
34. The North Carolina General Assembly recognized compensable occupational diseases in
1935. Act of March 26, 1935, ch. 123, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 130 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 97-52 to -76 (1985)). For a discussion of the development of the law in this area, see Note,
Development of North Carolina Occupational Disease Coverage, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341
(1971).
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-52 (1985).
36. Id. § 97-53.
37. Id. § 97-57.
38. Id. § 97-53. Claimants with lung disease connected to cotton dust exposure must sue under
the catchall provision of § 97-53(13) because such diseases are not among the enumerated prima
facie occupational diseases. See id. § 97-53. For a discussion ofsection 97-53(13), see infra notes 57-
59 and accompanying text.
39. See, eg., Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./King's Yam, 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983); Frady
v. Groves Thread, 56 N.C. App. 61, 286 S.E.2d 844 (1982), neither affid or rev'd per curiam, 312
N.C. 316, 321 S.E.2d 835 (1984).
40. See, eg., Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./King's Yam, 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983);
Haynes v. Feldspar Producing Co., 222 N.C. 163, 22 S.E.2d 275 (1942). Because the substances in
question usually are medically connected to the plaintiff's disease, the separate analysis of whether a
substance is a "hazard" as contemplated by § 97-57 had not arisen until Caulder. As the Caulder
court interpreted the section, a plaintiff must show that the substance is peculiar to the workplace to
be a hazard, and then that he or she was exposed even slightly to the substance at defendant's
workplace. See Caulder, 314 N.C. at 71-76, 331 S.E.2d at 646-50.
41. See, eg., Little v. Anson County Schools Food Serv., 295 N.C. 527, 531-32, 246 S.E.2d 743,
746 (1978).
42. See Appellant's New Brief at 14, Frady v. Groves Thread, 56 N.C. App. 61, 286 S.E.2d 844
(1982), neither afl'd nor rev'dper curiam, 312 N.C. 316, 321 S.E.2d 835 (1984), in which appellant-
plaintiff argued:
There is no requirement in the typical accident case that the accident had any causal con-
nection with the underlying condition. If the accident aggravated the underlying condition
whether the underlying condition was caused by a previous accident or disease or anything
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been to emphasize disability rather than the inception of a disease.4 3
Furthermore, the trend has been to concentrate on a hazardous condition's
contribution to such disability rather than its actual ability to cause the dis-
ease. 44 In fact, in Walston v. Burlington Industries4 5 the North Carolina
Supreme Court apparently recognized an "aggravation of pre-existing disease"
theory by amending the language of its original opinion, "[d]isability caused by
and resulting from a disease is compensable [only] when ... the disease is an
occupational disease, or is aggravated or accelerated by an occupational dis-
ease,"' 46 to read, "or is aggravated or accelerated by causes and conditions char-
acteristic of and peculiar to claimant's employment."47 It therefore was logical
for the court to place responsibility on Waverly Mills if a condition of its work-
place aggravated plaintiff's pre-existing lung injury.
The Caulder opinion, however, ignored several related issues. For example,
the court failed to address whether a distinction should be drawn between last
exposure to a substance that can trigger development of a disease and last expo-
sure to a substance that can only aggravate the symptoms of an existing disease.
This issue does not arise when all employers expose an employee to cotton dust,
because the last exposure is to a substance that is also a medical cause of the
disease. At least one defendant, however, has argued that the distinction be-
tween cause and aggravation is important. In Frady v. Groves Thread,48
although the court did not address the question, defendant argued that courts
must distinguish between substances that cause disease and those that merely
aggravate the symptoms of an existing disease; otherwise an employer in any
else, the resulting disability is compensable. There would appear to be no reason to apply a
different rule in occupational disease cases.
43. The event of disability rather than the date of the inception of a disease determines when a
plaintiff's cause of action arises. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-58 (1985); see Taylor v. Cone Mills Corp.,
56 N.C. App. 291, 301, 289 S.E.2d 60, 66, rev'd on other grounds, 306 N.C. 314, 293 S.E.2d 189
(1982). Disability is the "state of being incapacitated," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-55 (1985), or the
inability to earn the wages in the same or other employment that an employee was able to earn at the
time of the injury. Id. § 97-2(9); see Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 54 N.C. App. 173, 174, 282
S.E.2d 828, 829 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 305 N.C. 593, 290 S.E.2d 682 (1982). Professor
Larson suggests that the date of disability is used because of the difficulty in determining when a
disease develops, if it is one that develops over a long period of time. 4 A. LARSON, supra note 4,
§ 95.25(a).
44. See, eg., Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./King's Yarn, 308 N.C. 85, 104-05, 301 S.E.2d 359, 371-
72 (1983); Haynes v. Feldspar Producing Co., 222 N.C. 163, 166, 22 S.E.2d 275, 277 (1942); cf.
Dowdy v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 308 N.C. 701, 304 S.E.2d 215 (1983) (for cotton dust to be a dual
cause of plaintiff's chronic lung disease, his or her exposure to it must have significantly contributed
to, or been a significant causal factor in, the disease's development). The determination whether
there is a last injurious exposure under § 97-57, however, may be distinguished from the determina-
tion whether an occupational disease exists at all under § 97-53(13). Although the former section
requires only the slightest contribution, eg., Haynes v. Feldspar Producing Co., 222 N.C. 163, 166,
22 S.E.2d 275, 277 (1942), the latter section might require a significant contribution to the develop-
ment of the disease before it can be considered occupational. See, eg., Mills v. Mills, 68 N.C. App.
151, 156, 314 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1984).
45. 304 N.C. 670, 285 S.E.2d 822, amended by 305 N.C. 296, 285 S.E.2d 822 (1982).
46. Id. at 679-80, 285 S.E.2d at 828.
47. Walston v. Burlington Indus., 305 N.C. 296, 297, 285 S.E.2d 822, 828 (1982) (emphasis
added). For a discussion of a possible distinction between aggravation of the cause of a disease and
aggravation of symptoms, see infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
48. 312 N.C. 316, 321 S.E.2d 835 (1984).
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dusty atmosphere could be liable for a disability resulting from the dust's exacer-
bation of lung disease symptoms. 49 Similarly, one scholar has carried the dis-
tinction between causing a disease and merely aggravating a pre-existing
condition one step further and suggested a distinction between different types of
aggravation. Aggravating a pre- existing disease or allergy might differ from ag-
gravating a pre-existing weakness, he suggests, because the latter "has the effect
of increasing a worker's susceptibility to disease" whereas the former merely
exacerbates a condition rather than causes it.50
Furthermore, dicta in the Caulder majority opinion may have expanded
the types of substances that can be hazards under the last injurious exposure
rule. Recognizing that to be a hazard as contemplated by section 97-57 a sub-
stance must be "peculiar to the workplace,"5 1 the court held that synthetic fiber
dust is by nature peculiar to textile mills such as defendant's.5 2 Although un-
necessary under the facts, the majority noted that a substance could also satisfy
the requirement that it be "peculiar to the workplace" if it is merely found in
greater concentrations than the public generally encounters.5 3 Although the
concentration of a substance in the workplace might sometimes be relevant in
determining whether a hazard exists, 54 the dissent pointed out that the major-
ity's unqualified test suggests that even ordinary substances such as sand, dust,
or steam could be hazards under section 97-57 if found in large enough concen-
trations.5 5 The Caulder majority failed to address this possibility.
Because the majority opinion considered only whether synthetic fiber dust
was peculiar to Waverly Mill's employment and, therefore, a "hazard," the
court's analysis conflicts with a well-reasoned authority. In Frady,56 a case in-
volving facts virtually identical to those in Caulder, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals suggested that the threshold issue in determining whether there was a
hazard under section 97-57 was whether there was an occupational disease
49. See Appellee's New Brief at 8, Frady. Appellees argued that according to the expert testi-
mony any dusty area could have aggravated the symptoms of chronic lung disease to the point of
disability and, therefore, this condition was not confined to defendant's employment. Id.
50. Wilson, Occupational Disease-The Problems of a Comprehensive System of Coverage, I 1
INDUS. L.. 141, 148 (1982). However, Professor Wilson suggests an alternative way of viewing this
problem. A court could hold that "if the employment actually causes the disability, le., causes the
aggravation or otherwise, but not necessarily the disease, and the cause of the disability was a pecu-
liar risk of the employment,... then that will be an occupational disease and will be compensated as
such." Id. at 149. He suggests that the difference depends on the definition of occupational disease.
Id.; see also lB A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 41.63, at 7-454 (aggravation of pre-existing disease or
weakness as an occupational disease). For a discussion of the definition of occupational disease, see
infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
51. Caulder, 314 N.C. at 75, 331 S.E.2d at 649.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Because the court might require a significant contribution to find there is an occupational
disease, see, eg., Mills v. Mills, 68 N.C. App. 151, 314 S.E.2d 833 (1984), the concentration of the
harmful substance may be relevant.
55. Caulder, 314 N.C. at 79, 331 S.E.2d at 651 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
56. 56 N.C. App. 61, 286 S.E.2d 844 (1982), neither aff'd nor rev'dper curiam, 312 N.C. 316,
321 S.E.2d 835 (1984) (supreme court left the court of appeals' decision intact, but emphasized that




under section 97-53(13)5 7 Analysis of whether a compensable occupational dis-
ease exists still requires that the substance be peculiar to claimant's workplace, 58
but the Frady court emphasized the requisite causal connection, suggesting that
the connection must be between the substance in question and the disease, rather
than between the substance and the disability.59 A disease that a particular sub-
stance could not have caused would not be an occupational disease with respect
to that substance, and the question of last injurious exposure would never
arise.60 The Caulder court, however, did not first analyze whether Clifton
Caulder had an occupational disease, presumably because defendant did not
challenge the finding that plaintiff suffered from such a disease.6 1 Instead, the
Caulder court incorporated only the "peculiar to the workplace" part of the test
into its interpretation of "hazard." '62
Most importantly, however, the Caulder majority's reasoning conflicts with
the policies supporting the last injurious exposure rule and workers' compensa-
tion generally. Scholars examining the last injurious exposure theory of liabil-
ity63 generally recognize that exposure to many employers' working conditions
57. Id. at 65, 286 S.E.2d at 847. The catchall subsection of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13)
(1985), provides that an occupational disease can be "any disease... which is proven to be due to
causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or
employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is equally exposed
outside of the employment." See also supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (suggesting the
statute, read as a whole, first requires finding an occupational disease).
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13) (1985); see, e.g., Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./King's Yam, 308
N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983); Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981).
59. Frady, 56 N.C. App. at 65, 286 S.E.2d at 847; see also Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C.
44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981) (requiring proof of causal connection between the disease and the employ-
ment); Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979) (suggesting that a
disease is characteristic of a profession if there is a recognized link between the nature of the job and
an increased risk of contracting the disease).
60. Frady, 56 N.C. App. at 65, 283 S.E.2d at 847.
61. See Caulder, 314 N.C. at 71, 331 S.E.2d at 647.
62. The Frady opinion was filed after the supreme court issued its first Walston opinion, Wal-
ston I, but before the court amended the language of that first opinion in Walston I. See supra notes
45-47 and accompanying text. Because the court of appeals in Frady based part of its decision on
that critical language in Walston I, see Frady, 56 N.C. App. at 65, 283 S.E.2d at 847, that was
changed by Walston II, it is possible that the Frady court would have concluded that chronic ob-
structive lung disease was an occupational disease with respect to the synthetic fiber dust. Presuma-
bly this is why neither party in Caulder used the Frady decision to support its position. However, as
Justice Meyer emphasized in his dissent in Caulder, the Walston opinion as amended still contains
the qualifying language "characteristic of and peculiar to claimant's employment." Caulder, 314
N.C. at 78, 331 S.E.2d at 651 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
A related inquiry that the Caulder court did not make is exactly what is or is not peculiar to the
employment-dust in general or synthetic fiber dust in particular. See id. at 79, 331 S.E.2d at 651
(Meyer, J., dissenting). As Justice Meyer suggested, characterizing the substance as "dust arising
from the processing of synthetic fibers," id. at 75, 331 S.E.2d at 649, may lead to application of the
statute to common dust such as construction site dust. Id. at 79, 331 S.E.2d at 651 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting). On the other hand, when a court seeks to determine whether a substance is peculiar to
the workplace, once it defines the substance as synthetic fiber dust, then clearly it is by nature pecu-
liar to a synthetics processing mill, just as construction dust would be peculiar to a construction site.
63. A second theory of liability is apportionment. The apportionment theory is usually recog-
nized as the fairer of the two because it divides liability among all employers who were actually
responsible for the plaintiff's disability. Liability is divided among the employers in proportion to
degrees of exposure at each respective workplace. See, e.g., 4 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 95.12, at
17-11. According to Professor Larson, apportionment is "complicated by... out-of-state employ-
ers, statutes of limitations, and the difficulty of determining the proportion of liability attributable to
each [employer]." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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may contribute to a disability. 64 A disease might develop over a period of time
and might not manifest itself as a disability until after the employee quits work-
ing.6 5 Because the determination of which and in what degree an employer con-
tributed to the disease becomes an unwieldy process, applying a last injurious
exposure rule of liability saves both time and money.66 Although placing the
entire responsibility on one employer may seem unfair in a given case, the ineq-
uitable results in that case are justified when an industry is viewed as a whole. 67
The rule is ouly justified, however, when considering a specific industry in which
each employer consistently exposing employees to the harmful substance theo-
retically will be the last employer at some time and thus shoulder its share of
responsibility for the industry's overall hazardous work conditions. If, however,
the Caulder decision means that an employer can be liable under section 97-57
even if it is not one of a homogeneous group of employers responsible for creat-
ing the dangerous employment conditions, the majority opinion destroys the
traditional justification for the last injurious exposure rule of liability.
Moreover, once this reasoning has been established, it can be carried to
illogical extremes, thus undermining the general policy behind workers' com-
pensation. The textile employee who leaves the cotton mill to work on a con-
struction site or even the employee who leaves the cotton mill to become a
janitor could be exposed to dust that might aggravate his or her lung disease to
the point of disability.6 8 Imposing liability on these employers would cause the
64. See, eg., 4 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 95.24, at 17-148.
65. 4 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 95.11, at 17-109; Vokoun, supra note 6, at 107-08 (last expo-
sure rule developed as a rule of convenience); Comment, Living with Oregon's Adoption of the Last
Injurious Exposure Rule in Successive Injury Cases. Which Employer's Insurance Carrier Should
Pay?, 16 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 137, 138 (1979).
66. See 4 A. LARsoN, supra note 4, § 95.24, at 17-148; Note, Workers' Compensation: In Ap-
plying Last Injurious Exposure Rule to Workers' Compensation Claim Involving Successive Employ-
ers, Board Must Determine Whether Injury was the Legal Cause of Disability-Fluor Alaska, Inc. v.
Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 11 U.C.L.A. ALASKA L. REv. 223, 229 (1982).
67. 4 A. LASON, supra note 4, § 95.24, at 17-148 to -149. Some commentators distinguish
between the last exposure rule, which holds the last employer liable regardless of the employee's
degree of exposure from that employer, and the last injurious exposure rule, which requires that
there be some injury or causal connection between the condition and the disability. Eg., Vokoun,
supra note 6, at 112-16. However, the last exposure test might still require exposure to a substance
that could cause the disease if it were present in a large enough quantity. See id. at 104 (discussing a
case holding that "the last employment [must be] of the same type which risked the disease just as
did the first employment"). But see id. at 112 (suggesting that some jurisdictions would find the test
satisfied if "the employee's work with the last employer aggravated the prior condition" or the last
employment was the same type as the first whether or not it aggravated the disease). Therefore,
because the last injurious exposure test is a narrower test than the last exposure test, id., it seems
logical that this rule too would require exposure to a substance that could actually cause the disease.
Vokoun cites the North Carolina case of Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./King's Yarn, 308 N.C. 85,
301 S.E.2d 359 (1983), as adopting this latter rule by requiring the condition to be a significant
causal factor. Id. at 113. However, even though N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-57 (1985) designates "last
injuriously exposed," (emphasis added), the courts have not consistently required this significant
causal connection. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; text accompanying note 25.
68. Justice Meyer in his dissent suggested that the majority's opinion failed to clarify whether
great concentrations of ordinary dust like that from cooking fumes, construction sites, a school yard,
or cigarette smoke in a company office could lead to liability for the employer. Caulder, 314 N.C. at
79, 331 S.E.2d at 651 (Meyer, J., dissenting). According to Justice Meyer, the majority's characteri-
zation of the substance "not as 'synthetic fiber dust' but as 'dust arising from the processing of
synthetic fibers'" could lead to such expansive liability. Id.; see Appellee's New Brief at 8, Frady.
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workers' compensation system to cease to be a balance between providing com-
pensation to employees and fairness to employers 69 and in effect would become a
means of general health insurance.70
Resolution of these issues may lie with the North Carolina General Assem-
bly.71 The general assembly could amend the catchall definition of occupational
diseases in section 97-53(13) to address the definition of "hazard," the difference
between aggravation of a disease and aggravation of a disability, and the exact
meaning of "characteristic of and peculiar to claimant's employment." Virginia,
for example, by statutorily mandating that the occupational disease result "as a
natural incident of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature
of the employment," 72 requ!res that there be a direct causal relationship between
the work conditions and the disease. The Virginia statutes also require that the
disease "must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employ-
ment and to have flowed from that source as a natural consequence .... ,,73
Furthermore, some commentators have suggested that five conditions must be
met to find a compensable occupational disease:
(1) The disease must have its inception in the employment. (2) The
hazard must distinguish the occupation from the [risks to which the
general public is exposed]. (3) The hazard must have identifying char-
acteristics. (4) A causal or generally recognized relationship must ex-
ist between the hazard and the disease. (5) The compensability of the
disease must be determined by an administrative agency.74
In addition, because the textile industry and the development of chronic
obstructive lung disease are so prevalent in North Carolina, 75 the general assem-
69. See I A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 2.20, at 5. The North Carolina Supreme Court has
reasoned that workers' compensation, a substitute for remedies based on negligence, "broadened the
base and liberalized the scope of compensation benefits for industrial injuries. The Act contains
elements of mutual concessions between the employer and the employee .... Vause v. Vause Farm
Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 91, 63 S.E.2d 173, 175-76 (1951).
70. See Comment, The Ordinary Disease Exclusion in Virginia's Workers' Compensation Act
Where is It Going After Ashland Oil Co. v. Bean?, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 161, 168 (1983). In Vause v.
Vause Farm Equip Co., 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 173 (1951), the court determined that
"While such compensation is primarily charged to the industry, and consequently to the
employer or owner of the industry, eventually it becomes a part of the fair money cost of
the industrial product, to be paid for by the general public patronizing such product...."
However, it must be borne in mind that the Act was never intended to provide the
equivalent of general accident or health insurance.
Id. at 91, 63 S.E.2d at 176 (quoting Cox v. Kansas City Ref. Co., 108 Kan. 320, 322, 195 P. 863, 865
(1921); see also Duncan v. City of Charlotte, 234 N.C. 86, 91, 66 S.E.2d 22, 25 (1951) (emphasizing
that the rule of a causal connection is the very anchor of workers' compensation and that this pre-
vents it from becoming a means of general health insurance); Note, supra note 3, at 583 (Rutledge
does not turn the workers' compensation act into a means of general health insurance bec.-use it
requires a significant contribution to the disability).
71. As early as 1942 the court expressed its general dissatisfaction with the last injurious expo-
sure rule but recognized that the general assembly must address the problem. Haynes v. Feldspar
Producing Co., 222 N.C. 163, 170, 22 S.E.2d 275, 279 (1942).
72. VA. CODE § 65.1-46(2) (repl. vol. 1980).
73. Id. § 65.1-46(6).
74. Sears & Groves, Worker Protection Under Occupational Disease Disability Statutes, 31
RocKY MTN. L. REv. 462, 463 (1959).
75. See, eg., Ellis, The Brown Lung Battle, N.C. INSIGHT, April 1981, at 16, 16 (approximately
11,000 North Carolina textile workers are estimated to be disabled by brown lung, or byssinosis);
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bly might deal with these issues by specifically addressing this disease as it has
asbestosis and silicosis. 76 If necessary to control compensation for chronic ob-
structive lung disease, the general assembly could provide by statute that syn-
thetic fiber dust is a hazard of the disease as contemplated by section 97-57, thus
effectively eliminating the potential for illogical results made possible by the
Caulder decision.
In conclusion, Caulder belies the confusion that exists in North Carolina
occupational disease law. The supreme court limited its analysis and avoided
issues that, if addressed, might have eliminated some of the unanswered ques-
tions in this area of the law. Although the court may have provided relief for
plaintiff, its opinion ultimately may harm textile workers in general. 77 As the
dissent cautioned, the Caulder holding may make employers whose dusty work
conditions traditionally have not been connected to chronic obstructive lung dis-
ease reluctant to hire individuals who have spent considerable time in cotton
mills.
ANNE FERRELL TEAM
RESEARCH & STATISTICS DIVISION, N.C. DEPT. OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILL-
NESSES IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1983, Table 1, at 17, 19 (1985) (1983 annual average employment
column shows that textile mill employees account for 223,600 of 788,800 manufacturing employees
in the state); id. Table 2, at 23 (textile mill employees account for approximately 10.5%-13,986 out
of 133,219-of the total number of industry occupational injuries and illnesses in the state).
76. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-57, -58(a), -61.5(b) (1985).
77. Perhaps the Caulder court found in plaintiff's favor because he had no one else to sue. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-58 (1985) does allow an employee to sue the employer responsible, even if the
employee's disability developed after employment or even if the employer was not the last employer.
However, the employee has only two years after discovery of a disability to bring suit, id., and it is
possible that by the time of the opinion, Caulder's two years had expired.
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